













































































































































Income Effects of Federal Reserve 
Liquidity Facilities
Michael J. Fleming and Nicholas J. Klagge
One of the chief actions taken by the Federal Reserve in response to 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis was the introduction or expansion of facilities 
designed to provide liquidity to the funding markets. A study of the 
programs suggests that the liquidity facilities generated $20 billion 
in interest and fee income between August 2007 and December 2009, 
or $13 billion after taking into account the estimated $7 billion cost 
of funds. Moreover, the Fed took important steps to limit the credit 
exposure it incurred in connection with the facilities. 
A
fter the start of the ﬁ  nancial crisis in August 2007, the Federal Reserve adopted many 
measures to mitigate the disruptions in ﬁ  nancial markets, including the introduction or 
expansion of liquidity facilities. Many studies have found that the facilities were effec-
tive in promoting ﬁ  nancial stability during the crisis.1 In addition, because the facilities were 
designed according to well-understood lender-of-last-resort principles—the Fed’s loans were 
well collateralized and generally priced at a premium to the cost of funds—they also earned 
considerable income. 
While income generation is not the aim of the Fed’s policies, it is through such income that 
the Fed covers its expenses. Moreover, excess Federal Reserve income is turned over to the U.S. 
Treasury, offsetting the government’s need to raise such funds from other sources. In 2009, for 
example, the Federal Reserve Banks transferred $47.4 billion of their $52.4 billion net income 
to the Treasury.
In this edition of Current Issues, we use publicly available data to assess the effects of the 
Federal Reserve’s liquidity facilities on its interest and fee income.2 We estimate that the 
facilities contributed $20 billion to the central bank’s interest and fee income between August 
2007 and December 2009, the period of the facilities’ greatest usage. Meanwhile, the cost of the 
funds lent through the facilities amounted to only an estimated $7 billion, so that the facilities 
generated an estimated $13 billion in income in excess of the cost of funds.
The additional income generated by the Federal Reserve facilities came with additional 
credit risk, and some of the extra income should be considered compensation for this risk. 
However, the Fed took numerous facility-speciﬁ  c steps to keep credit risk to a minimum in 
operating its programs, such as limiting borrowing to institutions that met eligibility criteria, 
providing the loans on a short-term basis, and requiring that loans be backed by adequate 
collateral. As a result, the central bank has not borne any credit losses to date through its new 
or expanded liquidity facilities.
It is important to note that the Fed publishes income information in its annual report and 
in its monthly report “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet.” These reports 
contain actual income ﬁ  gures for many of the liquidity facilities and therefore offer an advan-
tage over the estimates presented here. Our analysis, however, serves somewhat different 
purposes. Speciﬁ  cally, it shows in a simple way how facility income can be estimated from 
public information. It also includes estimated income ﬁ  gures for some facilities not broken out 
in the ofﬁ  cial reports and provides ﬁ  gures for more granular intervals of time. Moreover, our 
analysis considers the facilities’ cost of funds and compares that cost with the income from 
the facilities.
1 See, for example, Cecchetti (2009) and Willardson and Pederson (2010). 
2 Because we focus on the liquidity facilities, we do not assess the income effects of the Fed’s asset purchase 
programs, support for speciﬁ  c institutions, or regular open market operations.2
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Federal Reserve Responses to the Crisis
To address the disruptions in ﬁ  nancial markets during the crisis, the 
Federal Reserve introduced or expanded liquidity facilities, provided 
support for speciﬁ  c institutions, and engaged in direct purchases of 
assets.3
Liquidity Provision to Banks
The Fed initially addressed liquidity pressures in the unsecured 
funding markets relied on by depository institutions. On August 17, 
2007, shortly after the start of the crisis, the Fed announced tempo-
rary changes to its primary credit discount window facility to reduce 
depository institutions’ uncertainty about the cost and availability 
of funding. In particular, the Federal Reserve reduced the primary 
credit rate, narrowing the spread of the rate over the federal funds 
target rate, and extended the allowable term of lending to as long as 
thirty days. The Fed later narrowed the spread of the primary credit 
rate over the federal funds target rate further and increased the 
maximum maturity of loans to ninety days.
On December 12, 2007, the Fed announced two new initiatives to 
address funding pressures in short-term lending markets. First, the 
central bank established the Term Auction Facility (TAF), through 
which it auctioned loans to depository institutions, typically for 
terms of twenty-eight or eighty-four days. Second, the Fed estab-
lished reciprocal currency arrangements, or swap lines, with the 
European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. The arrange-
ments addressed dollar funding pressures outside the United States 
by allowing foreign central banks to lend U.S. dollars to banks 
in their jurisdictions. The swap lines were later extended to an 
additional twelve foreign central banks.
Liquidity Provision to Dealers
In March 2008, around the time of the near-collapse of Bear Stearns, 
the Fed took several steps to address liquidity pressures in the 
secured funding markets relied on by dealers. On March 7, the Fed 
announced that it would initiate a series of single-tranche open 
market operations (OMOs) with the primary dealers—dealers that 
have a trading relationship with the Fed—in which dealers could bid 
to borrow funds through term repurchase agreements for a term of 
twenty-eight days.
On March 11, the Fed announced the introduction of the Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), through which it auctioned loans 
of Treasury securities to primary dealers for terms of twenty-eight 
days. As part of the TSLF, the Fed later announced the start of the 
Term Securities Lending Facility Options Program (TOP), through 
which the Fed auctioned options on draws on the TSLF.
The Fed then announced on March 16 the creation of the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), a standing facility through which the 
Fed made overnight loans to primary dealers. The rate charged was 
the same as the discount window’s primary credit rate, with an ad-
ditional fee assessed to frequent borrowers. The Fed later announced 
3  This discussion follows a more detailed overview in the appendix to the Federal 
Reserve’s February 24, 2009, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr_default.htm.
liquidity support for certain securities subsidiaries of Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch, and for Citigroup’s 
London-based broker-dealer subsidiary, under terms similar to that 
of the PDCF.
Liquidity Provision to Other Market Participants
Money market disruptions emanating from the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers led the central bank to introduce several additional 
liquidity facilities. On September 18, 2008, the Fed announced the 
creation of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). Through this facility, the 
Fed made loans at the primary credit rate to depository institutions 
and bank holding companies to ﬁ  nance their purchases of high-
quality asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market 
mutual funds. The AMLF helped money funds holding ABCP to meet 
redemption demands from investors and promoted liquidity in the 
ABCP and broader markets.
The Fed announced the creation of the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF) on October 7, 2008, to provide a backstop 
to issuers of commercial paper and thereby improve liquidity in 
short-term funding markets. Through the facility, the Fed provided 
credit to a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) that, in turn, bought newly 
issued three-month commercial paper from eligible issuers. Prices 
were based on a market rate plus a ﬁ  xed spread. Borrowers also had 
to pay a registration fee to participate in the program, and certain 
borrowers had to pay a credit enhancement fee.
On October 21, 2008, the Fed announced the establishment of 
the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). Through the 
MMIFF, the Fed could provide secured loans to a series of private 
sector SPVs to ﬁ  nance the purchase of certain money market instru-
ments from eligible investors. The facility, which was never used, was 
thus intended to improve the liquidity of money market investors 
and enhance their ability to meet redemption requests and their 
willingness to purchase money market instruments.
Finally, the Fed announced on November 25, 2008, its intent to 
create the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). The 
Fed made loans through the TALF to eligible owners of certain asset-
backed securities (ABS). Rates on the loans varied according to the 
type of collateral securing the loan, and the Treasury provided credit 
protection to the Fed through the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The 
TALF supported the issuance of ABS and thereby increased credit 
availability and economic activity.
Large-Scale Asset Purchases
To improve market conditions, the Fed also instituted programs to 
purchase assets directly. Under programs ﬁ  rst announced in November 
2008 and March 2009, the Fed ultimately purchased $1.25 trillion of 
agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), $172 billion of agency 
debt securities, and $300 billion of longer term Treasury securities 
by the end of March 2010. In August 2010, the Fed announced it 
would reinvest principal payments from its agency MBS and agency 
debt securities in longer term Treasury securities, and in November 
2010 it announced its intent to purchase an additional $600 billion in 
longer term Treasury securities by the end of June 2011.Support for Speciﬁ  c Institutions
The Fed also provided support for speciﬁ  c institutions to promote 
ﬁ  nancial market stability. In March 2008, it provided special ﬁ  nanc-
ing to facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase. 
In September and October 2008, the Fed provided support for AIG 
(American International Group) to assist the ﬁ  rm in meeting its 
obligations, to facilitate the orderly sale of some of its businesses, 
and to ﬁ  nance ﬁ  xed-income securities it held. In November 2008 and 
January 2009, the Fed agreed to provide credit under certain condi-
tions to Citigroup and Bank of America, respectively.
Balance Sheet Implications
The Federal Reserve’s efforts to mitigate the strains in ﬁ  nancial mar-
kets led to an unprecedented expansion of its balance sheet (Chart 1). 
Federal Reserve assets rose from $869 billion on August 8, 2007, to 
$2,256 billion on December 17, 2008, and stood at $2,237 billion on 
December 30, 2009. Assets increased fairly modestly through much of 
the ﬁ  rst year of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, as growth of the liquidity facilities 
was offset by decreases in securities held outright. In fall 2008, how-
ever, the liquidity facilities and total assets both grew sharply.
Changes in the amounts outstanding under the liquidity facilities 
are largely explained by the evolution of the three largest programs: 
the central bank liquidity swaps, the CPFF, and the TAF (Chart 2). 
Amounts outstanding were essentially zero before the introduction 
of the TAF and the liquidity swaps in December 2007. The facilities 
grew sharply in fall 2008—with the expansion of the TAF and the 
liquidity swaps and the introduction of the CPFF—to $1,599 billion 
outstanding on December 10, 2008.
Outstanding amounts under the facilities subsequently de-
clined to $168 billion on December 30, 2009, as market conditions 
improved and the facilities were largely wound down.4 The last 
single-tranche OMO outstanding matured January 28, 2009; the 
MMIFF was not extended past its October 30, 2009, expiration; and 
the AMLF, central bank swap lines, CPFF, PDCF, and TSLF all expired 
February 1, 2010.5 The ﬁ  nal TAF auction occurred March 8, 2010, 
and the extension of credit through the TALF expired March 31, 
2010, or June 30, 2010, depending on the type of ABS being ﬁ  nanced. 
Temporary changes to the discount window were also reversed in 
early 2010.
Income Effects of New Liquidity Facilities
We now assess the implications for Federal Reserve income of the 
new and expanded liquidity facilities from August 2007 through 
December 2009—the period of the facilities’ greatest usage. The 
income effects of the facilities are fairly straightforward to analyze. 
Interest rate risk was relatively low because the loans were short 
term, mostly ranging from overnight to three months. Credit risk 
was managed through the short term of the loans, the restriction of 
4  Nonetheless, total Federal Reserve assets did not change much over 2009, as 
the decline in the liquidity facilities was largely offset by the increase in assets 
acquired through the asset purchase programs.
5  In May 2010, the Fed reauthorized dollar liquidity swap lines with several 
foreign central banks through January 2011. In December 2010, authorization 
was extended through August 1, 2011.
lending to institutions that met eligibility criteria, and the require-
ment that loans be backed by adequate collateral.
We conduct our analysis of income on a daily basis using publicly 
available data. The data come from the Fed’s weekly statistical release 
H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances,” which reports amounts 
outstanding for the facilities; from the Fed’s websites for various auc-
tion facilities, which report rate and sometimes quantity informa-
tion; and from the websites of foreign central banks, which report 
loans of U.S. dollars funded through the central bank swap lines. We 
also use rate information from Bloomberg to estimate income and 
the Fed’s cost of funds.
Our analysis covers all dollar funding liquidity facilities. We 
exclude regular OMOs, which are used to implement interest rate 
policy rather than to mitigate liquidity disruptions, as well as the 
Fed’s traditional securities lending facility, which is designed to 
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve System.
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mitigate disruptions in the securities lending market as opposed to 
the dollar funding markets. Because we focus on liquidity facili-
ties, we do not assess the income effects of the Fed’s asset purchase 
programs or its support for speciﬁ  c institutions. Furthermore, our 
analysis only considers interest and fee income.
Income Estimation
Income is perhaps easiest to estimate for several of the Federal 
Reserve’s standing liquidity facilities, including the AMLF, discount 
window, and PDCF. Daily income for each facility is calculated as 
the amount outstanding for the facility on a given day times the 
prorated primary credit rate that day. For example, on October 20, 
2008, there was about $111.3 billion outstanding through the PDCF 
(including transitional credit extensions) and the primary credit rate 
was 1.75 percent, so the Fed’s earnings from the facility that day are 
calculated as $5.33 million, where $5.33 million = $111.3 billion × 
1.75 percent × 1 day/365 days.6
Income is also fairly easy to compute for many of the auction 
facilities. For the TAF, income is calculated as the amount outstand-
ing on a given day times the prorated, weighted stop-out rate asso-
ciated with the outstanding loans. On May 1, 2008, for example, 
$100 billion in TAF loans was outstanding and the weighted stop-
out rate associated with these loans was 2.845 percent, reﬂ  ecting 
$50 billion lent at 2.82 percent on April 10 and $50 billion lent at 
2.87 percent on April 24. The Fed’s earnings associated with TAF 
lending that day were thus $7.79 million, where $7.79 million = 
$100 billion × 2.845 percent × 1 day/365 days.
Income is calculated similarly for single-tranche OMOs, except 
that weighted-average interest rates are used instead of stop-out 
rates, reﬂ  ecting the fact that funds were allocated through multiple-
price auctions in this program instead of through single-price 
auctions as in the TAF.7 Swap line income is also calculated in the 
same way, taking into account whether foreign central banks offered 
funds at ﬁ  xed subscription rates or through single- or multiple-price 
auctions. (The Fed’s counterparties in these operations were the 
6 Note that amounts outstanding for these facilities were not publicly available on 
a daily basis when this article was being written, so we approximate the amount 
for any given day as the average amount outstanding over the week including that 
day. Also note that we credit the Fed’s earnings over the term of a loan from the 
day following loan commencement through maturity—on October 21, 2008, in 
this case. For the AMLF, the appropriate discount rate to apply depends on when 
the lending was initiated, but that information was also not publicly available 
when this article was being written, so we use the discount rate contemporaneous 
to the amounts outstanding. For the PDCF, we ignore frequency-based fees, which, 
as of February 3, 2009, went into effect if a dealer accessed the facility on more 
than forty-ﬁ  ve business days. For the discount window, we use the secondary 
credit rate and seasonal credit rate for the relatively small amounts lent through 
the secondary and seasonal credit facilities, respectively.
7 In a single-price auction, every winning bidder pays the same rate, which is 
the marginal, or stop-out, rate, regardless of its bid. In a multiple-price auction, 
winning bidders pay their bid rates. In ﬁ  xed-price subscriptions, bidders 
indicate the quantity of funds they want at rates ﬁ  xed by the lender, and funds 
are allocated in proportion to bid amounts if an auction is oversubscribed. We 
also account for differences in interest rate quoting conventions when estimating 
income. While the primary credit rate is annualized using a 365-day year, 
commercial paper rates and repo rates are annualized using a 360-day year. 
Moreover, commercial paper rates are quoted on a discount basis.
foreign central banks, but the foreign central banks generally paid 
an interest rate on their borrowings from the Fed that reﬂ  ected the 
income they earned in lending dollars to ﬁ  nancial institutions in 
their jurisdictions.) Income from TSLF operations is also calculated 
like income from TAF operations, taking into consideration the fact 
that fees were based on the market values of the borrowed Treasury 
securities and not the par values.
For the TSLF option program, income takes two forms. There is 
income associated with the sale of the options, calculated—for days 
when the underlying loan could be outstanding—as the quantity of 
options sold times the prorated, weighted stop-out rates associated 
with the option sales. In addition, if the options were exercised, there is 
income based on the strike price and the quantity of options exercised. 
In both cases, the calculations account for the fact that fees were based 
on the market values of the borrowings rather than the par values.
CPFF income is more challenging to estimate. One source of 
income is the interest and fees received on purchased paper. The 
interest rate for new paper varied by day, depending on the overnight 
index swap (OIS) rate and the commercial paper type. Unsecured 
commercial paper was priced at the three-month OIS rate + 
100 basis points, and was subject to an additional surcharge of 
100 basis points per annum unless the paper was secured or guaran-
teed to the Federal Reserve’s satisfaction. Asset-backed commercial 
paper was priced at the three-month OIS rate + 300 basis points.
We make various assumptions to estimate CPFF interest and fee 
income. We approximate the split between unsecured and asset-
backed commercial paper using the breakdowns given by the Fed in 
various reports.8 Interest income is then calculated based on average 
amounts outstanding each week and the weighted-average issuance 
rates associated with the amounts outstanding.9 We assume that 
90 percent of unsecured paper was subject to the surcharge, which 
generates fee income equal to that reported in CPFF ﬁ  nancial state-
ments for 2008 (that is, $290 million) given our other assumptions.
In addition to the interest and fee income directly tied to paper 
issuance, the Fed collected registration fees from issuers participating 
8 Financial statements for the CPFF report that 63.8 percent of the paper was 
unsecured as of December 31, 2008, and various issues of the Federal Reserve 
System monthly report “Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet” 
indicate that 36.1 percent of the paper was unsecured as of May 27, 2009, 37.2 per- 
cent as of June 24, 2009, 27.0 percent as of July 29, 2009, 28.9 percent as of August 26, 
2009, 29.7 percent as of September 30, 2009, 26.7 percent as of October 28, 2009, 
20.0 percent as of November 25, 2009, and 22.2 percent as of December 30, 2009. 
We apply the 63.8 percent ﬁ  gure to amounts outstanding until December 31, 2008, 
and linearly interpolate the percentages for dates between December 31, 2008, 
and December 30, 2009, making use of the reported observations for the 
intermediate dates.
9 Averages for the ﬁ  rst week of the program, when outstanding amounts 
rose quickly, are based on the part of the week the program was in operation. 
Weighted-average issuance rates depend on average issuance rates for a given 
week and the amount of outstanding paper estimated to have been issued that 
week, as calculated from end-of-week data. To simplify the analysis, we assume 
that paper generally matured after exactly thirteen weeks (ninety-one days). In 
practice, the stated maturity of the purchased paper was ninety days, although the 
actual maturity varied slightly if the maturity would otherwise occur on a weekend 
or holiday. In some instances, we assume that paper matured in the twelfth week 
after issuance to ensure that the amount of paper calculated to mature in a week 
was never less than the decline in the amount of paper outstanding.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   5
in the program. The one-time registration fees of 10 basis points 
were based on total possible issuance to the facility at a given time, 
which equaled the greatest amount of paper the issuer had outstand-
ing over the ﬁ  rst eight months of 2008. Financial statements for the 
CPFF indicate that $830 million in registration fees was paid in 2008. 
We amortize the $830 million over the life of the program assum-
ing that all the fees were paid when the program started and that no 
further fees were paid in 2009.10
TALF income is also more challenging to estimate. Lending rates 
for a given operation depended on the collateral backing the asset-
backed securities, whether the loan was ﬁ  xed rate or ﬂ  oating rate, 
and—if ﬁ  xed rate—the term of the loan (three years or ﬁ  ve years). 
We make various assumptions to simplify the estimation, including 
the assumptions that loans backed by a particular collateral type 
were either all ﬁ  xed rate or all ﬂ  oating rate and that all ﬁ  xed-rate 
loans were for three years.11
We then estimate TALF income based on the quantity of loans 
outstanding and the weighted-average lending rates associated 
with the outstanding loans. The weights are based on settled loan 
amounts and are not adjusted to reﬂ  ect loan amortization, which 
occurs as the underlying loans are paid off. An additional source of 
income is the administrative fee imposed by the Fed, which equals 
5 to 20 basis points of the loan amount. We amortize the fee over a 
three-year period.
Estimation of Cost of Funds
Through October 8, 2008, we estimate the cost of funds for the 
liquidity programs using the yield on the three-month Treasury bill. 
We do this for two reasons. First, the initial growth of the facilities in 
2008 was funded by the Fed’s divestment of most of its Treasury bill 
portfolio, whereby the Fed either sold its outstanding bills or chose 
not to reinvest the proceeds of maturing bills into new ones. As a 
result, the Fed’s bill portfolio dropped from $277 billion on August 22, 
2007, to $18 billion on September 24, 2008. The bills in the portfolio 
had ranged in maturity from zero to ﬁ  fty-two weeks, with most 
concentrated in the range of zero to twenty-six weeks.
Second, when lending through the liquidity facilities expanded 
sharply in fall 2008, the reserve effects were offset through the 
10 In fact, ﬁ  nancial statements for 2009 imply that an additional $19 million 
in registration fees was paid that year. Our amortization period initially runs 
through July 30, 2009, thirteen weeks after the originally announced program 
expiration date of April 30, 2009. On February 3, 2009, the program was extended 
to October 30, 2009, and on June 25, 2009, it was extended to February 1, 2010. 
The amortization periods were extended accordingly, on those dates, for 
registration fees not yet earned.
11 Speciﬁ  cally, we assume that loans to ﬁ  nance ABS backed by auto loans, 
commercial mortgage loans, equipment loans, and loans guaranteed by the 
Small Business Administration were ﬁ  xed rate and that loans to ﬁ  nance ABS 
backed by credit card loans, ﬂ  oorplan loans, insurance premium ﬁ  nance loans, 
residential mortgage servicing advances, and student loans were ﬂ  oating rate. 
We also assume, when applicable, that the average life of the collateral backing 
the ﬁ  xed-rate loans was at least two years and that student loan collateral was 
not government guaranteed and did not have a coupon rate tied to the prime rate. 
Note that detailed TALF loan data were not publicly available when this article 
was being written.
Treasury’s new Supplemental Financing Program, announced 
September 17, 2008. Through the program, the Treasury issues 
so-called supplementary ﬁ  nancing bills and deposits the proceeds 
with the Fed.12 The quantity of such bills outstanding peaked at 
$559 billion in fall 2008 (Chart 3). The maturity of the bills has 
ranged between 7 and 101 days.
From October 9, 2008, we estimate the cost of funds for the 
liquidity programs using the interest rate on excess reserve balances. 
The Fed began paying interest on reserves that day, and interest-
bearing reserves quickly became the primary way through which the 
Fed ﬁ  nanced its expanded balance sheet. Reserve balances at the Fed 
were $176 billion on October 8, 2008, but had averaged a much lower 
$19 billion over the calendar year to date. Such reserves grew to 
$856 billion by the end of 2008 and stood at $1,025 billion on 
December 30, 2009.
Another way to think of the cost of funds is to consider the 
characteristics of the assets being ﬁ  nanced. The liquidity facilities 
provided mostly short-term ﬁ  nancing, ranging from overnight to 
three months, for all but the AMLF and TALF. Moreover, the credit 
risk associated with the lending was managed to relatively low levels, 
through program terms. The three-month Treasury bill yield and the 
interest rate on reserves are thus reasonably close references in terms 
of maturity and credit risk to benchmark the performance of the 
liquidity facilities.
The cost of funds for a particular facility on a given day is esti-
mated as the amount outstanding under the facility that day times 
the applicable prorated interest rate for that day. On October 20, 2008, 
for example, the interest rate on excess reserves was 0.75 percent, 
so the cost of funds associated with the $111.3 billion outstanding 
under the PDCF that day is estimated as $2.3 million, where $2.3 mil-
lion equals $111.3 billion × 0.75 percent × 1 day/360 days.
12 Although interest on the bills is paid by the Treasury, and not the Fed, we 
consider the cost of the bill issuance in order to present a complete accounting 
of the funding costs associated with the facilities.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve System.
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Note that our cost of funds estimation is concerned with economic 
costs and not accounting costs. We thus consider the opportunity 
cost of lost interest income when the initial growth of the liquidity 
facilities was offset by the Fed’s sale or redemption of Treasury bills. 
Also note that estimation of the cost of funds is not pertinent to the 
TSLF and TOP, through which the Fed lent securities instead of cash. 
When securities were lent through those programs, the Fed main-
tained the right to the interest generated by the securities. As a result, 
the cost of lending the securities was close to zero.13
Findings
We ﬁ  nd that the Federal Reserve’s new and expanded liquidity 
facilities contributed about $19.8 billion to Federal Reserve interest 
and fee income between August 9, 2007, and December 31, 2009 
(Table 1). We estimate the cost of funds for these facilities at $6.9 bil-
lion over this period, implying a net contribution from the facilities 
of $12.9 billion. For 2008, in particular, the gross contribution was 
$11.7 billion, accounting for 26 percent of the Reserve Banks’ 
$44.9 billion income before expenses that year.
The central bank liquidity swaps, CPFF, and TAF alone accounted 
for an estimated $15.6 billion of income, or almost four-ﬁ  fths of total 
income from the liquidity facilities (Table 2). The CPFF was the larg-
est contributor, producing gross and net income of $5.9 billion and 
$5.3 billion, respectively. Interestingly, the CPFF was only the third-
largest liquidity facility in terms of average amount outstanding over 
the sample period, but it generated high income because of the wide 
spreads and fees required to participate in the program.
Other income estimates to note are those for the TSLF and TOP, 
for which net income equaled gross income, given that there was no 
cost of funds. The MMIFF was never utilized, and thus had gross and 
net income of zero.
The facilities’ contributions to Federal Reserve income varied 
considerably over time, reﬂ  ecting variations in program structures 
and market conditions (Chart 4). A comparison with amounts out-
13 The securities lending (TSLF and TOP) did put an encumbrance on the Fed’s 
balance sheet in the sense that securities out on loan could not be sold. The Fed 
also took on credit risk by engaging in the loans, although it managed such risk 
by specifying the quality of collateral it would accept, imposing haircuts on such 
collateral, requiring that the collateral be revalued on a daily basis, limiting the 
range of its counterparties, and imposing per-dealer borrowing limits.
standing over time (Chart 2) shows the outsized effects of the CPFF 
on income and how TAF income declined sharply, even as outstand-
ing amounts under the TAF remained high. The drop in TAF income 
reﬂ  ects the fact that every TAF auction in 2009 stopped out at the 
minimum auction fee of 25 basis points, whereas earlier auctions 
stopped out at rates as high as 4.67 percent.
The cost of funds relative to income also varied signiﬁ  cantly 
over time, reﬂ  ecting variation in Treasury bill rates, the interest rate 
on reserves, and the rates at which the Fed lent money through the 
facilities (Chart 5). The CPFF, in particular, provided funds at wide 
spreads to the interest rate on reserves, contributing to the sizable 
differential between gross income and the cost of funds after the 
CPFF’s launch in October 2008. The sharp decline in the cost of 
funds in early December 2008 reﬂ  ects the reduction from 1 percent 
to 0.25 percent in the interest rate on excess reserves at that time. 
Comparison with Figures Released by the Fed
In cases where our estimates can be compared with ﬁ  gures in the 
Fed’s ofﬁ  cial reports, the numbers are quite similar. For 2008, a 
comparison of the Fed’s reported ﬁ  gures and our estimates, in italics, 
shows a close similarity across six facilities: AMLF ($470 million, 
$341 million), central bank liquidity swaps ($3,606 million, 
$3,334 million), CPFF ($1,707 million, $1,724 million), discount win-
dow ($512 million, $511 million), PDCF ($511 million, $508 million), 
and TAF ($3,305 million, $3,306 million).
Table 1




Fee Income Cost of Funds
Net Interest/
Fee Income
2007 (Aug. 9 – Dec. 31) 92 62 30
2008 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31) 11,668 5,057 6,611
2009 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31) 8,016 1,738 6,278
       Total 19,775 6,856 12,919
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on data from Bloomberg L.P., the Federal Reserve 
System, and foreign central banks.
Table 2




Fee Income Cost of Funds
Net Interest/
Fee Income
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility 380 172 208
Central bank liquidity swaps 5,543 1,793 3,750
Commercial Paper Funding Facility 5,937 650 5,287
Discount window 744 410 334
Money Market Investor Funding 
F a c i l i t y 000
Primary Dealer Credit Facility 546 254 292
Single-tranche open market 
operations 1,277 787 489
Term Asset-Backed Securities 
Loan Facility 436 59 377
Term Auction Facility 4,131 2,732 1,399
Term Securities Lending Facility 777 0 777
Term Securities Lending Facility 
Options Program 6 0 6
       Total 19,775 6,856 12,919
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on data from Bloomberg L.P., the Federal Reserve 
System, and foreign central banks.
Note: Actual income ﬁ  gures for many of the facilities are available in the Federal 
Reserve’s annual report and in its monthly report “Credit and Liquidity Programs 
and the Balance Sheet.”  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   7
interest and fee income between August 2007 and December 2009, 
even as they mitigated disruptions in the dollar funding markets. 
The cost of the lent funds amounted to only an estimated $7 billion, 
so that the facilities generated an estimated $13 billion in income 
above the cost of funds. Moreover, the credit risk that came with the 
additional income was kept to a minimum by the numerous steps 
taken by the Fed to limit such exposure.
To evaluate the implications of all of the Federal Reserve’s actions 
during the crisis, one should also consider its support for speciﬁ  c in-
stitutions and its direct purchases of assets. These other efforts had 
different risk characteristics and—given their different purposes—
were not designed to wind down as quickly as the facilities; thus, 
they are better evaluated over a longer time period. Our study, focus-
ing exclusively on the liquidity facilities, concludes that the initiatives 
had a clear positive effect on Federal Reserve income. 
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For 2009, a close similarity is also evident across seven facili-
ties: AMLF ($73 million, $39 million), central bank liquidity swaps 
($2,168 million, $2,184 million), CPFF ($4,224 million, $4,213 mil-
lion), discount window ($204 million, $204 million), PDCF 
($36 million, $38 million), TAF ($786 million, $787 million), 
and TALF ($468 million, $436 million).14
In sum, for the numbers that are directly comparable, the Fed 
reports interest and fee income from the liquidity facilities that is 
$445 million higher than our estimates. It follows that if one employs 
the ofﬁ  cial income ﬁ  gures reported by the Fed, supplemented by 
our estimates for facilities not broken out in the Fed’s reports, then 
the estimated income from the facilities between August 2007 and 
December 2009 is $20.2 billion instead of $19.8 billion. Income 
exceeding our cost of funds estimate is then $13.4 billion, instead 
of $12.9 billion. 
Conclusion
The Federal Reserve’s new or expanded liquidity facilities were 
proﬁ  table, contributing an estimated $20 billion to the central bank’s 
14  Our AMLF estimates are low because they apply the contemporaneous 
discount rate to amounts outstanding, whereas the actual rate paid depended on 
the discount rate at the time the loan was initiated. As we observed, information 
on when lending was initiated under the AMLF was not publicly available when 
this article was being written. These TALF ﬁ  gures include interest income and 
administrative fees, and do not reﬂ  ect the effects of TALF LLC.
Source: Authors’ estimates, based on data from Bloomberg L.P., the Federal Reserve 
System, and foreign central banks.
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